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Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of 
science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. 
The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is 
characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then 
drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction 
in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the 
incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises 
are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The 
conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling 
neither in favour nor against scientific realism. 
 
 
1. Models and fictions in recent philosophy of science 
 
There has been an intense interest in fictionalism in recent philosophy of science, as 
witnessed by a large number of symposia, workshops and conferences organised on the 
topic. It seems closely linked to the booming interest on the practice of modelling in the 
last two decades. Among the most relevant collections one finds the volume compiled 
by Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan (1999) on the mediating role of models. On 
this view models turn to be neither true to theory, nor just a faithful repository of data, 
but are thoroughly infused by idealisation and other features of the imagination more 
generally. The role of models in guiding reasoning as opposed to merely stating truths 
about their target systems, is also explored in the series of books edited by Lorenzo 
Magnani out of the Pavia conferences on model based reasoning in science (e.g. L. 
Magnani 1999). A more theoretical or philosophical treatment of idealisation in 
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modelling is presented in the essays collected by Martin Jones and Nancy Cartwright 
(2005).  
 
These collective efforts are not the result of new developments in metaphysics or 
ontology but rather arise from attempts to understand the practice of modelling in the 
sciences. Thus fictionalism in philosophy of science emerges as the culmination of the 
detailed scholarship of the last couple of decades on modelling practices in the sciences. 
We should therefore not assume at the outset that this brand of fictionalism is merely a 
derivative of the fictionalism discussed in other areas of philosophy, such as 
metaphysics, the philosophy of language, mathematics, or aesthetics. In particular the 
brand of fictionalism nowadays discussed in philosophy of science has specific links 
with the techniques of idealisation, modelling and the imagination that philosophers of 
science have uncovered in the sciences. A thorough understanding of this brand of 
fictionalism requires a corresponding philosophical reflection upon such techniques.  
 
 
2. Fictionalism and philosophy 
 
In metaphysics and philosophy of language, fictionalism is typically contrasted with 
realism – as a thesis regarding the ontological status of those entities putatively referred 
to in fiction and fictional discourse. Roughly, realists claim that those objects have some 
mode of existence besides or alongside the concrete objects of ordinary experience 
typically studied in the empirical sciences. By contrast fictionalists claim that there is no 
reason to suppose that such objects exist, and in particular that fictional discourse is 
perfectly meaningful and legitimate without any need to postulate any particular 
ontology. Fictionalism is thus meant to relieve us from heavy ontological commitments 
while essentially preserving all our linguistic practices. Not surprisingly the main 
arguments in favour of fictionalism in metaphysics are intimately related to 
considerations of ontological parsimony. 
1
 
 
Another area of philosophical research where similar distinctions have played an 
important role is the philosophy of mathematics. Here too we find fictionalism in the 
                                                 
1
 M. Kalderon 2005 is an excellent recent collection on fictionalism in metaphysics that draws all the 
right contrasts. 
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contrast class of realism, broadly understood. The debate between classical and 
constructive mathematics for example turns on the interpretation of the existential 
quantifier, and has often been seen to rest at least in part on the issue of the reality of 
mathematical entities. Classical mathematicians accept the principle of bivalence, and 
the law of excluded middle. By contrast constructionists contend that mathematics can 
not legitimately avail itself of either bivalence or excluded middle. As a result 
constructionists defend the view that the proper practice of mathematics can neither 
involve nor require any commitments to a pre-existent ontology of mathematical 
entities, or more generally truth-makers for mathematical existential statements. The 
truth of mathematical statements requires the construction of a proof. 
2
 
 
More contemporarily, mathematical fictionalists contend that the practice, language and 
results of modern classical mathematics do not require a commitment to the reality of 
any mathematical entities.  Contemporary fictionalism does not abandon classical 
(bivalent) mathematics, but instead attempts to piggy back on all its results while 
withdrawing the ontological commitments. The strength of this form of mathematical 
fictionalism is supposed to lie precisely in the avoidance of the ontological 
commitments without demanding any revision of classical mathematics or its practice. 
Not surprisingly it is a very lively option in the field. 
3
 
 
 
3. Fictionalism and science 
 
By contrast in the recent literature in the philosophy of science the terms ‘fiction’ and 
its derivatives ‘fictionalism’, ‘fictionalising’, ‘fiction making’, are used to refer to a 
prominent and some argue universal feature of modelling practice. “Fictionalism” in 
this context is not primarily at least a view in metaphysics or even ontology, but rather a 
view in methodology. More particularly it is a view about the methodology of model 
building in science. 
4
 On this view, modelling involves assumptions whose main 
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 This is of course a rough summary. The literature on intuitionism and constructive mathematics is 
immense – a classic is M. Dummett 2000. See also C. Chihara 1990 for an extended philosophical 
commentary.  
3
 For two contemporary defences of mathematical fictonalism see H. Field 1980, and M. Balaguer 1998. 
4
 Sometimes it is also presented as a view about the ontology of models, encapsulated in the slogan that 
“models are fictions”. But both the slogan and the view it summarizes are controversial (see e.g. R. Giere 
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function is as props or vehicles for the imagination. Such fictional assumptions are both 
essential and ubiquitous in science. We could then summarise the view as follows: 
 
Scientific Fictionalism (SF): The exercise of the creative imagination is indispensable in 
order to arrive at fertile representations of the sorts of systems studied in the natural and 
social sciences.  
 
A number of caveats are in order. First of all, the exercise of the creative imagination in 
the sciences is not entirely unconstrained. More specifically the use and application of 
scientific fictions is instead governed by a number of norms and requirements that do 
not regulate the use of other forms of fiction, such as artistic or literary fiction. So 
although (SF) accepts that the practice of model building is driven by the goals of 
greater enlightenment and understanding promoted by the exercise of the imagination, it 
also accepts that there will be particular constraints on this exercise. Second, and 
related, the emphasis on “fertile” is important. The aim is to produce representations 
that possess a certain virtue – and this will be the source of some of the particular 
constraints upon the use of fictions in science. Thirdly, the indispensability claim is 
restricted to model-based science – since the claim that fictional assumptions are 
essential is in principle restricted to that particular form of scientific activity. So we are 
not here making any claims regarding either scientific theorising, or the mere registering 
and recording of experimental data. 
5
 
 
Regardless of caveats, an important prima facie consequence of (SF) is that there is no 
requirement that particularly fertile representations be accurate or true. And indeed 
idealisation, distortion, and even inconsistency are all so rife within modelling practice 
that misrepresentation appears to be in practice a precondition for modelling to achieve 
its aims. This is a fundamental insight of the literature of the last two decades, and is 
nowadays a commonplace in the discussions surrounding scientific representation too. 
6
 
Let us refer to these ‘idealising’ or ‘distorting’ assumptions in modelling as fictional 
                                                                                                                                               
2009), or at least more controversial than the form of fictionalism I discuss here. So I will not discuss 
them extensively here. 
5
 This is not to exclude a role for fictions and fictionalising in those activities, or more generally outside 
modelling. J Rouse 2009 for instance, claims that fictionalising has a role in the laboratory sciences too, 
and in particular fictional assumptions are built into model organisms.  I do not need to consider such 
radical views in this paper; for our purposes the restriction of fictionalism to modelling practices is 
certainly enough.  
6
 See e.g. M. Suárez 2003, G. Contessa 2007, B. Van Fraassen 2008. 
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assumptions or, simply, fictions. The fictionalist is committed to the indispensability of 
fictions in scientific representation. The question I explore in this essay is the extent to 
which this commitment brings the fictionalist into conflict with scientific realism. 
 
Scientific realism (SR) is nowadays almost always understood as a thesis concerning 
the aim of science. More specifically, (SR) asserts that science aims at truth. 
7
 It is thus 
perhaps unsurprising that scientific fictionalism has been seen to conflict with scientific 
realism: does it not follow from (SF) that science can not aim at truth? 
8
 In this paper I 
attempt to identify precisely this perceived threat to realism, making explicit the 
reasoning that leads to the appearance of conflict, and carrying out a proper 
philosophical analysis. My conclusion will be that there is no genuine threat because 
there is no valid argument to the contradiction of (SF) with scientific realism. On the 
contrary these two views may – although they need not – live happily together. 
9
  
 
 
4. Fictional versus fictive representation 
 
Let me then begin by discounting an ontological distinction between two ways in which 
a representation may be said to involve fiction. Although the distinction is clear and 
cogent, it has not been judged to be relevant in the elucidation of representation in 
science, and similarly I claim that the debate about fictions need not appeal to this 
distinction. But since the claim that (SF) and (SR) contradict each other often 
presupposes this distinction, it will pay to make it explicit and discount it.  
 
From an ontological point of view, there is a clear difference between a representation 
of a non-existing entity, and an incorrect representation of a real entity. Both are 
misrepresentations in the sense alluded in the previous section – but the reason why 
each of them fails to accurately represent its target is very different. As an illustration of 
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 B. Van Fraassen 1980, p. 7. 
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 Scientific realists and antirealists alike have recently voiced the suspicion. Among the former: M. 
Morrison 2009, P. Teller 2009, and R. Giere 2009. Among the latter: A. Fine 2009, echoed by T. 
Knuuttila 2009 and my own Suárez 2009, among others. In this paper I do not presuppose any view 
whatever regarding realism.  
9
 My aim in this paper is not to defend realism, but fictionalism. I shall claim that there is no argument 
against (SF) from scientific realism. In this regard (SF) is fundamentally distinct from its cousins in 
metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics: Unlike these, (SF) is acceptable independently of one’s 
views in the realism-antirealism debate.  
 6 
the difference, consider James Clerk Maxwell’s mechanical “vortex” models of the 
ether; these models fail to represent their target simply because their intended target 
does not exist. The primary failure is not one of accuracy, but existence. By contrast, 
consider most idealised models in current science: however inaccurate these models are 
in different respects and to some degree, their targets are, supposedly, real existing 
objects. Thus the Newtonian model of the solar system is inaccurate – it does not 
describe correctly the precession of the perihelion of mercury, among other phenomena. 
But this is not to deny that the solar system exists and is real, nor is it to deny that the 
model is a representation of it.  
 
Let us introduce some terminology to mark the distinction. Let us refer to the former 
case as fictional representation and the latter as fictive representation, as follows: 
 
Fictional representation: X represents an imaginary entity Y 
 
Fictive representation: X inaccurately represents a real entity Y 
 
The defender of (SF), who is committed to the indispensability of the imagination in 
modelling, can happily accept that all scientific representation is necessarily either 
fictional or fictive (or both!). The scientific realist by contrast seems hard pressed to be 
able to accept this. For the realist science aims at truth, so it must at least in principle be 
the case some scientific representations are neither fictional nor fictive. 
10
 
 
 
5. The incompatibility between scientific realism and fictionalism 
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 This is not to say that the defender of (SF) is committed to the view that all representation is fictional – 
i.e. committed to there failing to even exist a target in the real world for scientific models to represent. 
Similarly, scientific realists need not be committed to the view that no scientific representation is fictional 
– i.e. that no genuine representation fails to have a target in the real world. Thus defenders of (SF) can – 
and normally will – accept that the solar system is real and the Newtonian model is a genuine, albeit 
inaccurate, representation of this real system. And scientific realists can – and normally will – accept that 
Maxwell’s vortex models of the ether are representations of an entity that Maxwell himself could not 
have foreseen not to exist. Thus, as mentioned in the main text, the fictional / fictive representation 
distinction, however cogent, does not cut very deep in this debate. The disagreement, if any, is not about 
ontology, but about methodology and the aim of science. 
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This is where the contradiction seems to lie: The thought that all representation is 
fictional or fictive seems prima facie to conflict with realist intuitions. Such an 
argument is implicit in recent writings of philosophers on this topic, and we may refer 
to it as the incompatibility argument (IC). It aims to show that fictionalism is 
incompatible with scientific realism. But let us try to make both the intuitions and the 
argument more precise. More specifically let us try to derive the contradiction from an 
argument with just the right fictionalist premises.  
 
We already have unearthed two fictionalist premises. The first is that all representation 
is fictive or fictional since modelling always involves the exercise of the imagination: at 
least some of its assumptions are fictional. The second takes it that fictions, as the 
product of the exercise of the imagination, are hence unconcerned with truth. Both 
follow from (SF) as I have expressed it, although they could be motivated on different 
grounds too. 
11
 I shall be more specific regarding the second premise – for reasons that 
will become clearer later on – and will stipulate that the cognitive function of fiction is 
independent of its truth value or degree of accuracy. The antirealist conclusion (science 
does not aim at truth or accuracy) follows from these two premises only under a 
conditional third premise. To be more precise the conditional premise (iii) stipulates that 
if fictions are ubiquitous and their cognitive function is independent of their truth-value, 
then science does not aim at truth (not through its models at any rate). Let us refer to 
this as the conditional premise; and let us explicitly write down the argument in full. 
 
IC: The Incompatibility Argument 
 
i) All scientific representation involves fiction, i.e. it is either fictional or 
fictive. 
 
ii) A fiction’s cognitive function in inquiry is independent of its truth-value (or 
degree of accuracy). 
 
iii) If i) and ii) then science does not aim at truth. 
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 Conversely (SF) possesses further implications, but I shall not discuss them here since they are 
irrelevant to my purposes in this paper. 
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iv) Science does not aim at truth: Scientific realism is false 
 
 
Most philosophers of science who have written on the topic recently seem to implicitly 
accept the IC argument. They seem to assume that IC forces a choice between the 
fictionalist premise (i) and scientific realism, which is explicitly denied in iv). Realists 
have then been inclined to reject i) and thereby reject (SF) along with it; while 
fictionalists have been inclined to accept iv) thus rejecting scientific realism. 
 
But is a choice really required? The IC argument is valid as stated – but is it sound and 
cogent? Let us subject the incompatibility argument to careful analysis. Since premise i) 
is disputed by realists, we must leave it aside for the time being, and concentrate instead 
on the other two premises: the thesis that the function of fictions is independent of truth 
value, and the conditional premise that allows us to derive the conclusion from the 
premises. What is their status? 
 
 
6. Fictions in Science: The truth-conditional account 
 
The defender of (SF) takes it that fiction is ubiquitous in science: all scientific 
representation is fictional or fictive. But how exactly shall we characterise fiction? What 
are the identifying marks of fiction in science? The question is vexing and can receive 
several different answers. This paper adopts a functional characterisation of fiction, to 
be developed in the next section. In this section a still common yet incorrect alternative, 
the truth-conditional account, is critically discussed and rejected. 
 
The truth-conditional account takes it that the defining property of fiction is falsehood. 
12
 More specifically, on this account, for an assumption in a model to work as a fiction, 
this assumption must i) be truth-apt, i.e. must possess a truth value; ii) it must be false; 
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 This account presupposes a linguistic formulation of the assumptions within scientific models, and 
might seem to sit uneasily with a semantic conception of theories, the nowadays more popular view, 
according to which theories are collections of models and are not linguistic. But the truth-conditional 
account could be safely replaced with an application-conditional account that is compatible with the 
semantic conception and has identical consequences for the questions explored here.   
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and iii) users of the assumption (the ‘modellers’) must be aware of both the truth-
aptness and the falsehood of the assumption. In other words, the modellers must have 
access to, or knowledge of the truth conditions of the assumption – at least to the extent 
required for their correctly judging it to be false.  
 
This account of fiction agrees with much that has written on the topic over the years but 
it is on reflection inappropriate. Two sorts of considerations can be brought to bear 
against the truth-conditional account. First, there are intrinsic considerations related to 
the fact that the three conditions above are not all necessary, nor are they jointly 
sufficient. Second, there are considerations discussed in other fields, particularly 
aesthetics and the philosophy of art, which suggest that falsehood is both insufficient 
and inadequate as a requirement on fiction more generally. 
 
Let us look at sufficiency first. Are all assumptions in a model that satisfy i)-iii) 
fictions? Since (SF) promotes the ubiquity of fictions in scientific modelling, it could be 
supposed that a fictionalist would need to answer positively. But this would be a 
mistake, akin to an invalid transposition of quantifiers from ‘all modelling involves 
fictionalising’ to ‘all that modelling involves is fictionalising’. Not every assumption in 
a model is fictional; and maybe among those assumptions that are not fictional there are 
some that are false and known to be so. Certainly it does not follow from (SF) that i)-iii) 
are jointly sufficient for an assumption to be a fiction. 
13
 
 
How about necessity? Can there be fictional assumptions in a model which violate 
either i), ii), or iii)? Let me just focus on ii) and iii) here: I shall try to show they can not 
both be necessary conditions on scientific fiction. 
14
 The statement that all fiction is 
necessarily false entails that the fictional character of an assumption is a trans-historical 
matter (assuming of course that truth is trans-historical). For instance, the assumption 
that electric currents are generated by displacements in the ether is nowadays considered 
false. But it would not have been judged to be false in late 19
th
 century physics. So, 
whether an assumption works as fiction in a model is, on this view, something that can 
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 Particularly in cutting-edge areas of science the use of false assumptions might not answer to any 
exercise of the imagination at all, nor any pragmatic considerations, but might result out of bare necessity 
– there are simply no other assumptions that we could possibly bring to bear to the problem. The 
application of effective field theories might be a case; inflationary cosmology might be another.  
14
 This is not to say that I consider i) unproblematic. The question whether fictions are necessarily truth 
apt is interesting, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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be, if anything, only ascertained retrospectively. But combined with iii), this condition 
requires the user of a fictional assumption to be aware of its truth value – in particular 
the user must know that the assumption is false. It follows that those assumptions we 
take to have been fictional throughout the history of science (e.g. the ether, phlogiston, 
etc.) have not actually been fictions at all. And this is unacceptable if we take the 
historical record at face value. Hence ii) and iii) can not both be necessary conditions on 
scientific fiction. At least one of these conditions is violated by the fictions that have 
operated effectively silently throughout the history of science. (I say ‘silently’: it is a 
different matter altogether when it comes to those fictional assumptions that were 
knowingly taken to be fictions such as, possibly, the plum pudding model of the atom, 
frictionless planes, etc.).  
 
Hence i)-iii) are neither necessary nor jointly sufficient for fictions. In addition, one can 
find alternative arguments in other areas of philosophy suggesting that falsehood is the 
wrong kind of criterion to apply to fiction more generally. The fictional character of a 
story, for instance, does not seem to depend on there being no interpretation of the story 
that makes it true. What’s more: it is possible, however unlikely, that the story be true of 
our actual world, even under the standard interpretation. 
15
 Consequently most accounts 
of fictions in the arts do not nowadays assume that fiction is false, but characterise it in 
independent ways. 
16
 I shall follow suit in the next section. 
 
 
7. Fictions in science: The functional inferential characterisation 
 
A more appropriate characterisation of fictions in science refers to their function in 
inquiry. More precisely we may adopt a deflationary attitude towards the nature of 
fiction by assuming that there are no defining properties of a fictional assumption. 
Instead we identify fictional assumptions in virtue of family resemblances that hold 
between the roles they play in inquiry. Such identification is fallible – it does not 
amount to a definition, but at best a characterisation. Following Vaihinger I shall 
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 David Lewis credits Saul Kripke with this insight (D. Lewis 1978, p. 39) in relation with the Sherlock 
Holmes stories. Lewis’s account gets around the problem of the possible enactment of the fictional story 
in the actual world by requiring that the story be told as known fact in the actual world. One need not 
accept a Lewisian account of fiction in order to share the view that a fictional story may as a matter of 
fact be true.   
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 Walton’s make belief account is a good example (K. Walton 1990).  
 11 
assume the function of fictions in science is related in this manner to the maxim of 
expediency. 
17
 
 
However expediency must be defined with respect to some aim. In line with an 
inferential conception of representation more generally, I will take it that the key 
function of fictions is to provide inferential expediency. A fictional assumption allows 
quick and efficient inference within the framework of a model. In other words, fictions 
provide inferential shortcuts in models; and the fact that this is the main or only reason 
for their use, distinguishes them as fictional. 
18
 
 
Let me expand on this characterisation by very briefly referring to two examples. One is 
the Maxwellian mechanical model of the ether in the mid to late 19
th
 century. The other 
is the contemporary model of stellar structure that one finds in astrophysics. In both 
cases assumptions are made that are functioning fictionally because their truth or falsity 
is irrelevant to their role. In Maxwell’s case this is arguably the function of the 
‘vortexes’ in the ether. In the stellar structure model this is the role of the assumptions 
of isolation, standard composition and shape, and thermal equilibrium. In different 
modelling contexts these assumptions allow for a different set of inferences to be 
drawn. Some of these inferences are to empirically testable conclusions (electrical 
current displacements, including the speed of light in Maxwell’s case; the Hertzsprung 
Russell law in the stellar structure case). 
 
We do not need to consider the details of these models closely here. The important point 
is this: the function of a fictional assumption in a model is to provide, in conjunction 
with further background assumptions and knowledge, conditional statements. Scientist 
can then employ these statements to reason from properties of the model to empirical 
consequences of the target systems. Thus the assumption of vortexes in the ether 
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 See (H. Vaihinger 1924, p. 99). This is not to say that Vaihinger was completely clear in his 
characterisation of fictions in science. In particular he failed to distinguish the truth-conditional and the 
functional characterisations, and tended to run together the thought that the truth-value of fiction is 
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course just a matter of rhetoric. If the function really is independent of truth value then fictions can be 
true or false regardless. The point is that the functional characterisation is primary and the truth-
conditional is at best a happy by-product.  
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 This is the view defended in M. Suárez 2009, which also includes a discussion of the two examples 
mentioned in the main text.  
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models, for example, allows us to predict stellar aberration phenomena. From the 
knowledge of star distances and motion via the model’s assumptions – including the 
fictional vortexes – we are led to the empirical prediction of the changes of relative 
positions of different stars in the sky throughout the year. Given our knowledge of the 
physics of matter and radiation and the properties standard in the interstellar medium, 
the idealising assumptions behind the stellar structure models similarly allow us to 
derive predictions of correlations of apparent brightness effective temperature on the 
surface of the star, conditional on some knowledge of distance and age of the star. And 
so on.  
 
To put it in a nutshell, fictional assumptions may be identified functionally by their 
inferential roles. Given a particular context of inquiry these assumptions, jointly with 
background knowledge and further assumptions in the model, entail conditionals with 
fictional properties in the antecedent and measurable properties in the consequent. We 
may refer to these as the fictional conditionals entailed by the model in a given context 
of inquiry. 
 
Fictional Conditionals: Given B1 & B2 & […]: If F1 & F2 & […] then M1 & M2 & 
[…], where {B1, B2, etc} are non-fictional background assumptions, {F1, F2, etc} are 
model assumptions, containing at least some fictional ones, while {M1, M2, etc} are 
measurable properties of the target systems. 
19
 
 
On the functional view of scientific fiction, the point of fiction making is to provide us 
with those fictional conditionals which best facilitate the inference from background 
knowledge to measurable consequences. Hence the use of fictions in science is justified 
by the maxim of expediency in inference.
20
 This inferential and functional 
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 The application to our two examples is as follows. In the ether model case: Given rectilinear finite-
speed starlight: If a star moves with respect to the ether in such and such a ways & earth moves with 
respect to the ether so and so then – relative positions in sky change seasonally so and so (stellar 
aberration). And in the stellar interior model case: Given star distance D & star age A: If temperature at 
core is T1 & gas volume at star birth is V & […] then – brightness now is B & effective temperature is TE.  
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 It would be nice of course if this inferential characterisation of fictions turned out to be more general, 
or even universal – and some very sympathetic audiences have suggested this to me. I confess that I find 
it difficult to see how it could seriously apply outside science. It is hard to find any other area of human 
activity where fiction making is driven by the maxim of inferential expediency. (Compare e.g. literary 
fiction which seems to me to divert often maximally from any form of expediency). I prefer to think that 
the inferential characterisation provides a way to precisely distinguish scientific from non-scientific uses 
of fiction.   
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characterisation of scientific fictions is supported by Vaihinger’s original insights, by a 
large number of case studies, and by the unavailability of any other credible account of 
scientific fiction. But it moreover backs up premise ii) in the incompatibility argument 
(IC). For the inferential role of fictional assumptions presupposes absolutely nothing 
regarding their truth value. (In other words the inferential function is performed just as 
well by a set of fictional assumptions {F1T, F2T, etc} that turn out to be all true, by a set 
of false fictional assumptions {F1F, F2F, etc}, or by any other ‘mixed’ set of true and 
false assumptions). Hence we have independent reasons to adopt this inferential and 
functional characterisation of fiction in this paper. If only for the sake of argument, this 
characterisation appropriately grounds the first two premises in the (IC) argument, thus 
providing the most favourable setting for the claim that (SR) and (SF) contradict each 
other – precisely the claim that we aim here to criticise. 
 
 
8. Truth-driven inquiry and fictionalising in science 
 
We have now found good grounds for accepting that the fictionalist must be committed 
to both premises i) and ii) in the incompatibility argument (IC). So we must now turn 
our attention to the conditional premise iii). Suppose that we find grounds for iii) too. 
This would show the (IC) argument is both valid and sound. The scientific realist would 
then want to use the (IC) argument to provide a reductio of fictionalism. The fictionalist 
by contrast would employ (IC) as a powerful argument against scientific realism. In 
either case, conflict is ensured. But is the incompatibility argument cogent? It seems 
clear now that the answer to this question turns on a premise that has not before been 
made explicit and has received very little attention even implicitly, namely the 
conditional middle premise iii). This is the premise that allows the argument to move 
from the fictionalist-grounded premises i) and ii) to the antirealist conclusion. The 
defender of the incompatibility argument (IC) must assume that the fictional 
assumptions that (SF) postulates as a necessary part of all scientific models cannot be 
reconciled with the aim to seek out truth according to (SR). This is the intuition that 
needs backing up in order to defend premise iii). 
 
Notice however, that there is much of interest that we have discovered along the way. In 
particular in our attempt to clinch premise ii) for the fictionalist we have developed a 
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new understanding of scientific fiction. This new understanding takes a deflationary 
attitude to the nature of fiction in science, and provides a family resemblance 
characterisation instead. The resemblance is in their function in inquiry only: Fictions in 
science promote a form of expediency in inference. Contrary to what one may have 
thought, truth value, and in particular falsehood, is not a defining feature of fiction in 
science. 
 
This has interesting consequences for the (IC) argument. For it turns out that the notion 
of fiction that grounds premise ii) provides no grounds whatever for the conditional 
premise iii). And conversely: the notion of fiction that would ground the conditional 
premise – and which probably is in the mind of most of its proponents – can not ground 
premise ii). 
 
Let us make this claim more precise. The conditional premise (iii) requires fiction to 
always necessarily involve falsehood – or at least the absence of truth. For only then can 
one can safely go from “all scientific representation involves fiction, and a fiction’s 
cognitive function in inquiry is independent of its truth-value” to “science does not aim 
at truth”. In other words premise iii) is true under the truth conditional account of 
fiction. But this is not the account that grounds and justifies premise ii) from a 
fictionalist point of view. So the account of fiction that makes true the conditional 
premise iii) also happens to make premise ii) doubtful. Under the truth conditional 
account of fiction the (IC) argument is not cogent because premise ii) is unwarranted. 
 
However, the truth-conditional account was critically analysed and discarded for 
independent reasons in section 6 anyway. An alternative functional and inferential 
characterisation was developed in section 7, and we saw that it appropriately grounds 
premise ii). So let us now focus on the inferential characterisation of fiction. On this 
view the function of fiction is to promote inferential expediency by providing the 
modeller with a number of fruitful fictional conditionals, which allow for inference to 
relevant measurable properties or quantities. But we have already noted that inferential 
expediency in no way requires the fictional assumptions to be false. On the contrary, the 
fictional properties mentioned in the antecedent {F1T, F2T, etc} may all turn out to be 
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true! 
21
 In other words the inferential characterisation of fictions grounds premise (ii) in 
the (IC) argument but at the expense of the conditional premise (iii), which is now left 
lacking in justification. 
 
Hence (IC) fails to be cogent whatever understanding of fiction in science is adopted, as 
long as it is consistently applied throughout. The only way to push (IC) through to its 
conclusion is by surreptitiously changing the meaning of ‘fiction’ half-way through the 
reasoning, in moving from premise ii) to premise iii). The appearance of conflict thus 
reveals inadequate attention by philosophers so far to the nuances of fictions and their 
role in science, and a failure to make explicit the argument for conflict. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
It is a common place in many areas of philosophy that realism and fictionalism are 
contrary positions. In metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics for example, 
fictionalism has emerged as a powerful alternative to the extant realist views. In both 
areas the conflict between these two views seems clear. So it is not entirely surprising 
that their homonyms have also been thought to similarly come into conflict in the 
philosophy of science. However, the thought may just result from faulty association. 
 
In this paper I have provided an updated and appropriate expression for the view that 
may be called scientific fictionalism (SF). I have contrasted two different accounts of 
fiction and defended a functional characterisation in terms of inferential expediency. I 
have then analysed the supposed conflict between (SF) and scientific realism and have 
found no good argument to this conclusion. On the contrary it does not seem possible to 
derive antirealist conclusions from the appropriate fictionalist premises. This not to say 
that scientific realism is true, and of course it is not to say that scientific fictionalism 
(SF) must be committed to it. Although these views have not been shown to be in 
                                                 
21
 There are no grounds to suspect this is the case in the two examples that I provided. In Maxwell’s case 
the fictional assumptions are false. But in the stellar structure models case, some of the assumptions 
(isolation, and initial composition) can be seen to be innocuous idealisations: although not strictly true, 
their departure from truth is minimal. The literature on idealisation is of course immense, but there is no 
room to canvas the full range of idealisations here. (See e.g. M. Jones and N. Cartwright 2005 for some 
discussion).  But the brief argument above already supports the view that whether the fictions in a model 
are idealisations or not is irrelevant to their inferential function as fictions. If so a study of the varieties of 
idealisation will not have a significant impact upon the thesis defended in this paper.   
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conflict, and they could in principle live together happily, it is of course logically 
possible that independent arguments will lead us to reject either. And indeed diverse 
considerations can be, and have been, brought to bear in favour of one of these views 
over the other. For example there are many well known and powerful arguments against 
scientific realism, 
22
 but not so far against fictionalism – certainly not against the form 
(SF) defended here. Thus the fact that there is no clash between these two views does 
not entail that there are no rational grounds to adjudicate and evaluate them on their 
own merits. However, this work still remains to be done. Fictionalism will not be 
defeated by a mere expression of faith in scientific realism. 
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